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Abstract. This paper presents a new way of applying Bayesian assessment to systems, which consist of many 
components. Full Bayesian inference with such systems is problematic, because it is computationally hard and, far 
more seriously, one needs to specify a multivariate prior distribution with many counterintuitive dependencies between 
the probabilities of component failures. The approach taken here is one of decomposition. The system is decomposed 
into partial views of the systems or part thereof with different degrees of detail and then a mechanism of propagating 
the knowledge obtained with the more refined views back to the coarser views is applied (recalibration of coarse 
models). The paper describes the recalibration technique and then evaluates the accuracy of recalibrated models 
numerically on contrived examples using two techniques: u-plot and prequential likelihood, developed by others for 
software reliability growth models. The results indicate that the recalibrated predictions are often more accurate than 
the predictions obtained with the less detailed models, although this is not guaranteed. The techniques used to assess 
the accuracy of the predictions are accurate enough for one to be able to choose the model giving the most accurate 
prediction. 
 
Keywords: Bayesian reliability assessment, fault tolerance, prediction accuracy.   
 
1. Introduction 
Off-the-shelf (OTS) components containing software are used widely for both development of new systems and 
upgrading existing (i.e. legacy) ones as part of their maintenance. The main reason for the trend is the low cost of 
OTS components compared with a bespoke development. 
Dependability assessment of systems built with off-the-shelf components, however, is problematic [1]. The 
components are assessed typically in isolation or as part of their working in different operational environments. 
Porting the knowledge about their dependability acquired in one operational environment to a new operational 
environment is problematic. Unless software is free of design faults a good reliability record in the past in a 
different operational environment does not guarantee that it will also work reliably in the new operational 
environment, although the past record can be used to back a priori expectations for reliable operation in the new 
environment.  
This difficulty in reusing assessment results has led some industries to look for solutions of assessment/certification 
without reference to the particular operational environment. For instance, the automotive industry introduced the 
concept of “Safety Element out of Context” (ISO 26262) to allow for certification of off-the-shelf components 
outside a specific operational environment. It remains to be seen how this idea will be used in practice – we hope 
“Safety Element out of Context” will be used as evidence of an adequate process and, thus, inform a reasonable 
belief in good quality, rather than as a substitute for assessment in the intended operational environment. 
This paper applies Bayesian dependability assessment when a non black-box model of a system built with 
components is used. The paper uses several non black-box models which apply different degrees of abstraction to 
the system structure. Each of the non black-box models thus allows for different details to be accounted for which 
remain hidden by a black-box system model. There are several reasons to choose the non black-box over the black-
box system model: 
- Black-box model is not practicable for assessing ultra reliable software [2]. Indeed, using Bayesian 
assessment to get high confidence in ultra-high reliability will require an unrealistic amount of statistical 
testing unless one starts the assessment with ultra-strong prior belief. With non black-box model the 
confidence may grow faster [3]. 
- Even if black-box is adequate as a model for the intended new operational environment, one needs to build 
a prior distribution for system reliability, e.g. system probability of failure on demand (pfd) from the 
available evidence about reliability of the components used in the system. In this case one would ideally 
like to use all the evidence available in the prior– good reliability record about the part of the system which 
remains unchanged and a good record, possibly in a different operational environment, about the new 
components added to the system. Defining a prior distribution for the system reliability, which accounts for 
these sources of evidence, requires a non black-box model of the system.  
Bayesian assessment with a non black-box model, however, poses its own difficulties: 
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- For any Bayesian inference defining an adequate prior is problematic. With a non black-box system model 
a multivariate inference is needed for which the usual difficulty of justifying the prior becomes even more 
difficult. Counterintuitive dependencies – how a change of my belief about X should influence my belief 
about Y – need to be quantified, which is really very hard [4].  
- Using conjugate families [5] to alleviate the difficulty in defining multivariate distributions may have 
unpleasant consequences as reported in [3].  
- Applying Bayesian inference numerically is a computationally intensive problem as it requires computing 
of multiple integrals over multivariate distributions of typically very small probabilities (e.g. the 
probabilities of failure of software components and of multiple software components failing together).  
This paper’s approach to the problem is pragmatic. System reliability is assessed by decomposing the system into 
manageable views. Each of the views focuses on a particular, typically small, part of the system (sub-system). The 
key element in the approach is that the views are defined in such a way that each sub-system appears in multiple 
views: e.g. one in which the particular sub-system is treated as a black-box (a coarse view) and one in which the 
same sub-system is shown in greater detail (a refined view). Bayesian inference can be applied with each of the 
views. Thus for a sub-system included in two views two predictions of this sub-system pfd will exist – from the 
coarse and from the refined views. The key element of the approach presented here is ‘recalibrating’ the coarse 
view using the predictions obtained with the refined view.  
A central part in our approach is measuring the accuracy of the predictions obtained with the coarse and recalibrated 
view and choosing the one that is most accurate for the data at hand. For this we adapt techniques developed in 
software reliability growth modelling and discuss their suitability to our context.  
The approach proposed in this paper can be applied to systems with different complexity, e.g. systems with 
structures ranging from a handful of components to those with a large number of components. The paper presents 
how the approach works using a system with a relatively simple structure: a legacy software system which is 
upgraded with a fault-tolerant component. The choice of such a system is dictated by several considerations: i) the 
example is important in practice - our previous consultancy work involved looking at exactly this system structure; 
ii) limiting system complexity allows for clear description of the proposed approach without having to deal with 
unnecessary system complexity. Scalability of the approach is discussed separately in the Discussion section.   
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 states the problem addressed in the paper; Section 3 presents the 
approach of multi-views Bayesian assessment. Section 4 evaluates the usefulness of the approach using a series of 
contrived examples and Section 5 discusses the findings and their practical implications. Section 6 summarises the 
relevant research. Finally, Section 7 summarises the results and outlines directions for future work. 
2. The problem 
Consider the system schematically shown in Figure 1. It represents a legacy system subject to an upgrade: the rest 
of the system (ROS) is upgraded with a 1-out-of-2 fault-tolerant component (FT-component), which in turn consists 
of two components, channel A and channel B, which are integrated with the rest of the system via an interface. An 
example of an FT-component might be a reliable smart sensor in which two or more devices of similar 
functionality, but based on different physical principle for measurement are used. An upgrade of the FT-component 
is a typical practical problem for safety-critical applications with very long life. For such applications it is typical 
that long before they are decommissioned the components used in the original design are likely to cease to be 
manufactured by the respective vendors due to technological improvements. If the FT component has to be replaced 
the only viable option is for it to be upgraded with newer components.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A ‘legacy’ system with a fault-tolerant component subject to an upgrade. The fault-tolerant component is a 1-out-of-2 
system, the two channels of which are integrated with the ‘rest of the system’ (ROS) through an interface. As a result of the 
upgrade the entire sub-system – both channels and the interface – will be replaced. ROS remains unchanged. 
Before we give a probabilistic description of the model presented in Figure 1 a few words about the ‘components’ 
of the system. ROS
1
 and the two channels, A and B, are self-explanatory. The fourth box, ‘Interface’, encompasses 
                                                          
1 ROS itself can consist of many individual components. This complexity, however, is ignored here. We initially limit the level 
of detail to keep the system structure simple and discuss the scalability aspects including the impact of the ROS’s structure in the 
Discussion section. 
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both the tangible substance of making it possible for the two channels to work with the ROS, e.g. wiring and signal 
processing hardware, and also the design of the interaction such as protocols, constraints, which may be 
implemented in software. The ‘Interface’ may fail in different ways – as a result of a fault in either its tangible part 
or as a result of a design fault. In a sense when it comes to modelling the failures of the system the ‘Interface’ will 
take the ‘blame’ for all failures which cannot be attributed to the other three components.  
2.1. Bayesian inference 
A Bayesian approach to reliability assessment of an upgraded on-demand system is used in this paper. The 
probability of failure on demand (pfd) is the measure of interest. The pfd of any component and of the system itself 
are treated as random variables to express the epistemic uncertainty about the value of the respective pfds. Some 
values of pfd are more believable than some other values and this is expressed by a probability distribution 
associated with the random variables.  
Prior to observing the system in operation various sources of knowledge, e.g. previous experience with similar 
systems, are used to justify the use of a particular distribution as an adequate representation of uncertainty of the 
assessor about the pfd in question. When the system is put in operation its failures/successes in processing different 
demands provide new evidence about the reliability of the system and of the components thereof. As a result, the 
assessor’s belief may change. Intuitively, frequent system failures should decrease the assessor’s confidence in high 
reliability (i.e. low values of the corresponding pfd become less believable than higher values of the pfd) while very 
rare failures will increase confidence in high reliability.  
If we treat the system as a black box, i.e. we can only distinguish between system failures and successes (Figure 2), 
the inference proceeds as follows. Denoting the system pfd as p, the posterior distribution of p after seeing r failures 
in n demands can be expressed as: 
)()|,(),|( xfxrnLnrxf pp  ,         (1) 
where )|,( xrnL  is the likelihood of observing r failures in n demands if the pfd were exactly x. This is given in this 
case (of independent demands) by the binomial distribution,
rnr xx
r
n
xrnL 





 )1()|,( . )(pf  is the prior 
distribution of p, which represents the assessor’s belief about p, before seeing the results of how the system 
processes n demands.  
The paper uses the convention of upper case letters to denote a random variable, e.g. PA, while lower case letters 
are used to refer to the values that a random variable takes, i.e. pA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Black-box model of a system. The internal structure of the system is unknown and cannot be used in the inference. 
Only the system scores on each demand – success or failure – are recorded on each demand and are fed into the inference 
procedure. 
With the non black-box model the scores at the outputs of the sub-systems (i.e. 0 - success or 1 - failure) are 
explicitly taken into account. They are recorded for every demand processed by the system and are then used in the 
inference. The system score can be a deterministic or a non-deterministic function of the scores of the sub-systems. 
If the system score is a deterministic function (called structure function, [6]) the system pfd can be expressed using 
the pfd of the components. Typical examples are serial and parallel systems, but the structure function of systems 
with more components may be significantly more complex.  
If the system failure is a non-deterministic function of the components, the system score needs to be modelled 
explicitly. 
A more refined analysis with the non black-box model would require knowledge of how many times each of the 
sub-systems is executed per demand (the control flow of executing a demand). This paper limits analysis to 
assuming that all sub-systems are used exactly once per demand.  
The example of an upgraded system, Figure 1, has a vector of component scores of four components, 
SROSSInterfaceSChASChB, and, hence, 16 different score combinations (0000, 0001, …, 1111) can be observed on a 
demand. 0000, for instance, represents the demands on which none of the components fails; 0001 represents the 
demands on which ROS, the Interface, and channel A, do not fail while channel B fails, etc. Finally, 1111 
represents the demands on which all four sub-systems coincidentally fail. Each of these score combinations can be 
observed on a randomly chosen demand.  
Sub-system A 
Sub-system B 
OR 
Demands System output 
Output A 
Output B 
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Probabilities: p0000, p0001, …, p1111 are associated respectively with each of the possible outcomes. Clearly, these 
probabilities sum up to 1 (with certainty one of the score vectors will be observed when the system is called upon), 
i.e.: 
11111111011011100101110101001
100001110110010101000011001000010000


ppppppp
ppppppppp
 
In other words, there are 15 degrees of freedom in describing the joint behaviour of the system. The probabilities, 
p0000, p0001, …, p1111, are clearly related to the pfd of the sub-systems. For instance, the probability of failure of ROS, 
pROS, is the sum of the probabilities p1XXX, where ‘X’ can be either 0 or 1, i.e. when ROS has failed no matter 
whether the other sub-systems failed or not on the same demand. Formally, this can be expressed as follows: 
 
PROS = p1000 + p1001 + p1010 + p1011 + p1100 + p1101 + p1110 + p1111. 
 
Similar expressions can be derived for the marginal probabilities of failure of the other components: pInterface, and the 
two channels of the fault-tolerant sub-system pChannelA and pChannelB. 
Non black-box Bayesian inference in the system (Figure 1) will, thus, require a 15-variate prior distribution to be 
defined, which the Bayesian inference will transform to a posterior distribution using the prior and the score vectors 
observed in operation. The variates of the joint distribution can be any 15 out of the 16 probabilities listed above, 
p0000, p0001, …, p1111, or any function defined on these probabilities, e.g. some of the marginal probabilities of the 
components. The joint distribution will describe the assessor’s belief/knowledge about the system’s failure 
behaviour prior to and after the observations, respectively.  
Various distributions of interest can be derived from the joint posterior distribution, e.g. the pfd of any of the 
components, subsystem or system pfd in case these are deterministic functions of the pfds of the components. If the 
pfd of interest is explicitly a variate in the used posterior distribution, deriving the marginal distribution of the pfd 
merely requires integrating out the nuisance parameters of the posterior distribution. If the pfd of interest is not 
explicitly represented in the joint distribution, then a transformation is required of the prior/posterior joint 
distribution to another distribution in which the pfd of interest appears explicitly as one of the variates of the 
distribution. Such a transformation is a standard operation from calculus. From the transformed joint distribution the 
marginal distribution of interest will be derived by integrating out the nuisance parameters.  
If system failure is a non-deterministic function of the sub-system scores, we will need to add an extra variate – the 
system score. For our problem this addition will require a 31-variate distribution in order to describe 
probabilistically the failure behaviour of the system. 
Clearly the full model of the system, Figure 1, is very complex. Even if the system score is a deterministic function 
of the component scores, one needs (at least) a 15-variate distribution and to do inference with it! The problems 
associated with a multivariate Bayesian inference (difficulty to define sensibly multivatiate priors and 
computational difficulties with the inference itself) make a good case for an effort to simplify the multivariate 
distribution used in the inference. Using a simplified inference, however creates a new problem – controlling the 
error due to the simplifications introduced. In both cases there will be errors: in the former case this will be the error 
due to poor prior while in the latter case – the error due to the model simplification made. It is far from obvious 
which is better – using a full inference starting with a poor prior, i.e. one which captures poorly the true belief of the 
assessors or using a simplified prior which defines the problem more simply, requires fewer parameters from the 
assessor and thence may capture more accurately the true belief of the assessor, but ignores some aspects of the 
system model, which may turn out to be important.  
2.2. Simplifying the prior distributions  
An extreme case of simplifying the model of the system is treating the system as a black-box. This simplification 
can be applied to any system. In this case only a univariate distribution of the system pfd is required and the 
inference is computationally trivial but, as discussed above, is problematic for ultra-high reliability ranges [2] and in 
integrating in the prior the previous knowledge that might be available about the reliability of components.  
If the system is modelled as a non black-box several options exist for simplifying the system model, which in turn 
will reduce the complexity of the prior and of the inference.  
 Assume that some of the components are perfect. In the case of an upgrade (Figure 1), for instance, assuming 
that the interface between ROS and the upgraded components is perfect (i.e. does not contain design faults) 
may be relatively easy to justify, e.g. if the integration is ‘trivial’ or can be tested exhaustively. Such a 
simplification in the example system will reduce the size of the distribution needed to a 7-variate distribution. 
Although this is a significant reduction in comparison with the 15-variate case, it still poses difficulties for the 
assessor to specify a sensible prior.  
 Assume some form of independence between the variates in the joint prior distribution. Assuming 
independence between the uncertainties associated with the variates in the prior, for instance, one might be able 
to justify assuming independence between the uncertainties associated with the pfd of ROS and of the fault-
tolerant component by lack of evidence on the contrary. Note that such an assumption is different from 
assuming that the components fail independently, an assumption for reliability of hardware components [7]. In 
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the former case we merely assume that the pfds of the ROS and of the FT-component are independently 
distributed random variables, while in the latter case we postulate that whatever the ‘true’ probabilities of 
failure of the individual channels the probability of their failing together will be a product of these ‘true’ 
probabilities. In other words in the latter case we postulate that we know with certainty how to derive the 
probability of simultaneous failure from the marginal probabilities of failure of ROS and of the FT-component 
and that the only uncertainty in the model is associated with those marginal probabilities. The two assumptions 
of independence have very different implications. In the former case (independent distributions) an erroneous 
assumption can be ‘fixed’ when the system is observed in operation and the collected data suggest that the 
components tend to fail non-independently. On the contrary, once the failures of the components are assumed 
to be independent, even very strong evidence against the assumption cannot fix the error.  
 The model can also be simplified by making various conditional independence assumptions. This alternative 
line of reasoning is not pursued in this paper but is discussed briefly in Section 5.   
 Simplify the inference by decomposing the system model into simpler ‘views’, each of which is tractable both 
computationally and in terms of defining plausible priors. The example system from Figure 1 can be 
decomposed as shown in Figure 3 using two ‘views’, the course view of the system and the refined view of the 
FT components. Each of these models consists of two components and their probabilistic description (3-variate 
joint distributions) can be derived from the full multivariate distribution by integrating out different nuisance 
parameters. The two 3-variate models are significantly simpler than the full non black-box system model. Each 
of the models can be used on its own for Bayesian assessment of the sub-system it represents. A key element of 
the paper proposes a way of combining the results of the two inferences, by recalibrating the posterior derived 
with the coarse view using the posterior derived with the refined view. In order to be able to do that we require 
that the views be chosen to allow for alternative ways of expressing the same variate – in this example the pfd 
of the FT-component.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Two-tier view on the system: In the ‘coarse view’ the FT-component is represented as a black-box. In the ‘refined 
view’ this black-box is detailed as a 1-out-of-2 system. In the ‘coarse’ view the system consists of two components – ROS, 
and the FT-component. The refined view consists of the channels of the FT-component only. 
 
Note that the coarse view is more detailed than a black-box view of the system. The coarse view allows us to use 
the knowledge accumulated to date about the quality of ROS when specifying the prior for this view, while if the 
black-box view is used this is not explicitly required, instead the black-box view only requires a distribution of the 
system pfd to be specified, which will clearly be affected by the pfd of ROS, but in a complex way. The refined 
view, on the other hand, allows us to use the detailed information about the two channels of the fault-tolerant 
component and distinguish between the four possible observations of these two channels in operation (each may fail 
or succeed on a demand); such detailed knowledge is ignored in the coarse view. In summary, although each of the 
two views defined above differs from the full model of the system, they account for important aspects of the 
components of the system.  
Decomposing the system model into partial views replaces the problematic inference using the full system model 
with new problems: 
- how to combine the two posteriors derived with the two partial models (views), and 
- finding out if combining the two views improves the prediction accuracy in comparison with the simpler 
alternatives such as using the coarse view or the black-box model of the system, which offer ways of 
expressing the system pfd. 
Assessing the predictive accuracy of any inference is a problem relatively separate from the inference itself. 
Prediction accuracy has been studied in software reliability growth modelling. Techniques for assessing prediction 
accuracy objectively have been developed such as u-plot and prequential likelihood [8], which are applied here to 
the problem.  
Note at this point that we may construct three different prediction models of system pfd:  
 the black-box model, ignoring entirely any knowledge about the internal structure of the systems; 
 the coarse view (ignoring details about the FT-component structure);   
 recalibrated model which uses the predictions of the pfd of the FT-component to recalibrate the coarse model 
and obtain a prediction of the system pfd.  
Coarse view of system 
ROS 
Upgraded 
component 
UG (seen a 
black-box) 
Channel A 
Channel B In
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3. The solution: a multi-view Bayesian inference 
This section describes the main contribution of the paper, a multi-view Bayesian inferences procedure.  
The procedure consists of the following steps: 
 Step 1: Bayesian inference using a simplified system model (a “coarse” system model) in which the FT-
component is treated as a black-box; 
 Step 2: Bayesian inference with the FT-component only, in which the behaviour of the channels is 
modelled explicitly (a non black-box model of the FT-component is used) but the rest of the system is 
ignored; 
 Step 3: Recalibration of the system posterior is derived using the posteriors derived in Step 1 and step 2 
above. 
3.1. The coarse view system model: the FT-component viewed as a black-box 
Sub-systems ROS and UG (Figure 3) are assumed imperfect and their probabilities of failure are assumed uncertain, 
quantified using a probability distribution. We further assume that the ‘Interface’ component (Figure 1) is perfect, 
i.e. does not contain faults (design or any other). The scores of the sub-systems, which can be observed on a 
randomly chosen demand, are summarised in Table 1 (1 is used when the component fails to process the demand 
correctly, 0 – when the demand is processed correctly by the component). 
A 3-variate joint distribution is defined in which the variates can be any three out of the four probabilities listed in 
column three of Table 1, e.g. ),,(
111001 ,,
pppf , or derived from them. 
Given a set of observations, r1, r2, and r3 in n demands, the posterior distribution will be: 
 


111001
111001
111001
111001
,,
111001321,,
111001321,,
321,,
),,|,,,(),,(
),,|,,,(),,(
),,,|,,(
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
dxdydzppprrrnLzyxf
ppprrrnLzyxf
rrrnzyxf  (2) 
where 
  321321 111001111001
321321
111001321
1
)!(!!!
!
),,|,,,(
rrrnrrr
pppppp
rrrnrrr
n
ppprrrnL




    (3) 
is the multinomial likelihood of the observation (r1, r2, and r3 in n demands). 
 
Table 1 
Component scores  
ROS UG Probability  Observations in n demands 
0 0 p00 r0 
0 1 p01 r1 
1 0 p02 r2 
1 1 p11 r3 
Table 1. The combinations of component scores, which can be observed on a randomly chosen demand, are shown in the first 
two columns. The notations, used for the probabilities of these combinations on a randomly chosen demand, are shown in the 
third column. Finally, the number of times the various score combinations are observed in n trials (n = r0 + r1 + r2 + r3), are 
shown in the last column of the table. Note that r2 represents the number of failures of the fault-tolerant component UG, i.e. 
when both channels of this FT-component fail simultaneously. The individual channel failures are tolerated and not counted in 
this view. 
 
It is intuitively easier to express the prior in terms of probability of failure of the components ROS and UG. Clearly, 
the probabilities of failure of these, pROS and pUG, respectively, can be expressed as: 
1110 pppROS   and 1101 pppUG  . 
pROSUG represents the probability of simultaneous failure of both ROS and UG on the same demand, hence, p11  
pROSUG. The prior distribution ),,(
111001 ,,
pppf  can be transformed to a new set of variates, pROS, pUG, and pROSUG, 
),,(,, UGROSUGROS pppf , which can be easier for an assessor to work with
2
. Given the same observation, (r1, r2, and 
r3 in n demands), it can be shown that the posterior distribution can be expressed as: 



ABBA
UGROSUGROS
UGROSUGROS
UGROSUGROS
ppp
UGROSUGROSppp
UGROSUGROSPPP
ppp
dxdydzppprrrnLzyxf
ppprrrnLzyxf
rrrnzyxf
,,
,321,,
,321,,
321,,
),,|,,,(),,(
),,|,,,(),,(
),,,|,,(
,
,
       
(4) 
where 
                                                          
2 The transformation (change of variable) is a standard procedure in calculus which requires the Jacobian to be computed for the 
old and the new set of variates. For the particular transformation dealt with here, the Jacobian is equal to 1. 
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is the likelihood of the observation for the new set of variates used in the prior/posterior distributions. 
Up to this point the inference will be the same no matter how the event ‘system failure’ is defined. The marginal 
distribution of the system pfd, however, is affected by the structure model, i.e. how system failure is defined. In this 
paper we consider a serial system of ROS and UG (Figure 1): a failure of either of these two sub-systems leads to a 
system failure. Deriving the distribution of system failure would require a transformation of the posterior 
distribution, ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrnf UGROSUGROS ppp  , to a new distribution, ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrnf SUGROS ppp  , where for any 
values of PROS, PUG and PROSUG the new variable PS is defined as: PS = PROS + PUG – PROSUG. From the transformed 
joint distribution ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrnf SUGROS ppp   the marginal distribution of PS, ),,,|( 321 rrrnf Sp  , will be derived 
from ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrnf SUGROS ppp    by integrating out the nuisance parameters PROS and PUG.  
3.2. The refined view model: a detailed model of the upgraded FT-component 
This model is practically identical to the coarse model, the only difference being the notations used.  
The channels A and B of the FT-component are both assumed imperfect and their probabilities of failure are 
assumed uncertain, the uncertainty being quantified by a probability distribution, which is detailed below. The 
scores of the channels, which can be observed on a randomly chosen demand, are summarised in Table 2. 
A 3-variate joint distribution must be defined in which any three of the probabilities shown in Table 2 can be used 
as variates. Let us choose to use the probability distribution ),,(,, 
BABABA
pppf . 
        Table 2 
Channel scores   
Channel A Channel B Probability  Observations in n demands 
0 0 
BA
p  r4 
0 1 
BA
p   r5 
1 0 
BA
p  r6 
1 1 
BA
p  r7 
Table 2. The combinations of channel scores, which can be observed on a randomly chosen demand, are shown in columns one 
and two. The notations used for the probabilities of these combinations are shown in column three while the number of times the 
score combinations are observed in n trials, r4 – r7, respectively (n = r4 + r5 + r6 + r7), are shown in the last column of the table.  
 
Given a set of observations, r5, r6, and r7 in n demands, the posterior distribution will be: 
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is the multinomial likelihood of the observation (r5, r6, and r7 in n demands). 
It may be intuitively easier to express the prior in terms of the probability of failure of the channels, A and B, which 
can be expressed as follows: 
BABA
A ppp    and 
BABA
B ppp   . 
PAB represents the probability of coincident failures of both channels, A and B, on the same demand. The prior 
distribution ),,(,, 
BABABA
pppf  can be transformed to a new set of variates, PA, PB, and PAB, ),,(,, ABBA pppf , 
which can be easier for an assessor to work with. 
Given the same observation, (r5, r6, and r7 in n demands), it can be shown that the posterior distribution can be 
calculated as: 
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is the likelihood of the observation for the new set of variates used in the prior/posterior distributions. 
In this model we are only interested in the probability of failure of the FT component, i.e. in PAB, which can be 
derived from the posterior distribution (7) after integrating out the nuisance parameters, PA and PB. 
3.3. Recalibrated system model: combining the coarse and the refined views  
Now the procedure of recalibrating the posterior obtained with the coarse view using the posterior from the refined 
view on the FT component is described. 
One of the variates of the distribution, ),,,|,,( 321,, rrrnzyxf UGROSUGROS ppp  , used with the coarse view model (4), is 
PUG. In the refined view the same pfd, PAB, is expressed differently (7). Even if the coarse and refined views are 
used with consistent marginal priors, e.g. )()( 
UGAB pp
ff , due to using different information in both inferences the 
posterior distributions, in general, will be different, i.e. ),,,|(),,,|( 321765 rrrnfrrrnf UGAB pp  . The reader should 
have noticed by now that r7 = r1 + r3, i.e. the total number of failures of the FT-component (i.e. simultaneous 
failures of channel A and channel B in the refined view) is equal to the number of observations when the UG 
component fails on its own or simultaneously with ROS. 
In the coarse view, Section 3.1, by observing the system in operation we have learned about the epistemic 
uncertainties about the probabilities of failure of ROS and UG (including the dependencies between the variates). In 
the refined view this knowledge is not acquired. Instead, the refined view concentrates on learning how effective 
fault tolerance is for the FT-component, but ignores how it relates to ROS, i.e. whether there is evidence that ROS 
and the FT-component are failing independently or their failures are correlated – positively or negatively.  
The recalibration proposed here is based on the following rationale. We assume that the coarse system model 
captures accurately the epistemic uncertainty about the pfds of ROS and UG and their dependence. Formally, this is 
represented by the conditional distribution: 
)(
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      (8) 
We postulate that the conditional distribution (8) remains unaffected by the recalibration.  
In other words, we postulate that the recalibrated posterior, ),,(,, zf UGROSABROS ppp  , is defined as: 
)(
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p
ppp
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
. (9) 
4. Empirical Evaluation 
The inferences with the coarse and the recalibrated models differ significantly in complexity. Recalibration requires 
inferences with both the coarse and the refined view models and in addition a transformation of the entire posterior 
distribution obtained with the coarse model as suggested by equation (9).  
The obvious question is whether the extra complexity of recalibrated inference brings advantages in comparison 
with the simpler inferences. If it does, are they guaranteed whatever the priors and the observations or is more 
detailed analysis needed to identify whether recalibrated inference brings advantages with the specific problem at 
hand.  
The essential question is whether we can trust the predictions obtained with coarse and the recalibrated models. If 
the predictions they produce are the same, can we assume that they are accurate or despite their being similar do we 
still have to validate their accuracy? If, instead, the predictions obtained with the two models are different can we 
trust any of them and if so which one? The answers to these questions are not obvious. Clearly, both views ignore 
some aspects of system behaviour and thus introduce errors. We would like to scrutinise various aspects of these 
errors and come up with a practical advice on deciding if any of the predictions are accurate or not. 
This section starts with a contrived example to illustrate that the predictions obtained with the recalibrated inference 
may differ significantly from the predictions obtained with coarse system model. It then proceeds with a more 
detailed analysis of accuracy using a series of carefully chosen contrived numerical examples.  
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4.1. An example 
Consider an example parameterisation of the system, which uses the coarse and the recalibrated system models 
identified above. We define the prior distributions needed as follows.  
- The FT-component. The prior, ),,(,, ABBA pppf , is constructed under the assumption that )(Apf  and )(Bpf  
are both Beta distributions, ),,( B , in the interval [0, 0.01] and are independent of each other, i.e. 
)()(),(,  BABA pppp fff . The parameters α and β used in the examples for the two distributions are: αA = 2, 
βA = 2 for channel A and αB =3, βB = 3 for channel B, respectively. The conditional distributions, 
),|(,| BBAAppp pPpPf ABAB  , for every pair of values of PA and PB, are defined as Beta distributions, 
),,( baB   in the range [0, min(pA, pB)] with parameters αAB = 2, βAB = 2. These conditional distributions 
together with the defined above joint distributions ),(, BA ppf completely define the tri-variate prior 
distribution, ),,(,, ABBA pppf , used in the refined view of the FT-component. The marginal distribution 
)(
ABp
f  is derived from ),,(,, ABBA pppf  and used in the prior of the coarse view. No claims are made that the 
priors used in the examples should be used for practical assessment. They serve illustrative purposes only and 
yet, have been chosen from a reasonable range. Each of the channels, for instance, has an average pfd of 5.10
-3
, 
which is a value from a typical range for many applications.  
- The coarse system view. The system prior, ),,(,, UGROSUGROS pppf , is constructed under the assumption that 
the pfd of the ROS and of the UG component are independently distributed, i.e. )()(),(,  UGROSUGROS pppp fff .  
)(
ROSp
f  is assumed to be a Beta distributions, ),,( B , in the interval [0, 0.01] with parameters αROS = 3, 
βROS = 3, while )()( 
ABUG pp
ff  is as derived from the refined view of the FT-component. The conditional 
distributions, ),|(,| UGUGROSROSppp pPpPf UGROSUGROS   for every pair of values of PROS and PUG, are defined 
as Beta distributions, ),,( B  in the range [0, min(pROS, pUG)] with parameters αROSUG = 2, βROSUG = 2.  
- The observations. n = 4000 trials, rROS = 4, rA = rB = 10, rAB =  2; rROSUG =  2. In other words, the failures of 
the FT-component coincide with failures of theROS. One should also notice that 20% of the channel failures 
are simultaneous.  
This example represents a complex relationship between the failures of the channels of the FT-component on the 
one hand and the failures of ROS and of the FT component on the other hand.  
Figure 4 shows the difference in the predicted pfd of the FT-component obtained with the coarse system model and 
the refined model of the FT-component, while Figure 5 shows the system pfd obtained with the coarse and the 
recalibrated system models. 
 
 
Figure 4. The FT-component pfd derived 
with the coarse and the refined models. 
The pfd derived with the refined model is 
significantly worse than the posterior 
derived with the coarse model. Both are 
significantly worse than the prior. 
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The disagreement between the coarse and the refined views on the posterior pfd of the FT-component is significant 
(e.g. the confidence associated with a target pfd = 0.003 is 40% in the case of refined mode and almost 70+% with 
the coarse model). The refined posterior is clearly significantly more pessimistic than the one derived with the 
coarse model.  
The disagreement between the coarse and the refined views on the posterior system pfd is significant, too, (e.g. the 
confidence associated with a system target pfd = 0.004 is 50% with the coarse model and almost 80% with the 
recalibrated model). The recalibrated posterior is clearly significantly more optimistic than the one derived with the 
coarse model. This outcome is very intriguing but not easy to explain. The coarse model has captured the strong 
positive correlation between the UG (the FT-component) and the ROS – all observed failures of the two happen to 
be simultaneous. But the system is a serial one and for it positive correlation between the failures of the components 
means that their failure regions (on the demand space) overlap significantly, thus reducing the probability of system 
failure for the same probability of failure of the components. The recalibration of the system pfd posterior 
introduced by (9) preserves the conditional distributions, )|,(|, zPf UGppp UGUGROSROS  but changes the weights of 
the conditional distributions for the different values of the pfd of the FT-component. In the example, the posterior 
distribution of the FT-component obtained with the coarse model is stochastically more optimistic than the posterior 
obtained with the refined model of the FT-component. It appears that the recalibration leads to a better system pfd, 
but the mechanisms leading to an improved system pfd are not obvious.  
4.2. Accuracy of Bayesian predictions 
The difference between the predictions obtained with and without recalibration is not surprising, as already 
discussed. To these two prediction models we can, of course, add a black-box system model, which operates with 
even less detailed data than the coarse model does.  
Littlewood et al. developed techniques for assessment of prediction accuracy of various software reliability growth 
models [8]. These methods allow one to compare objectively how two prediction models compare in terms of 
prediction accuracy (i.e. which of them gives systematically more accurate predictions) and even, under certain 
conditions, to assess whether the predictions are optimistic or pessimistic. The two techniques, prequential 
likelihood and the u-plot, are used to assess the accuracy of predictions obtained with the available models - the 
black-box, the coarse and the recalibrated models. Appendix 1 provides a summary of the techniques.  
4.3. More examples 
We now study the prediction accuracy of the models using data generated via Monte-Carlo simulation of the 
behaviour of the system under consideration (Figure 1). Four different systems are simulated using parameters as 
shown in Table 3. These are the true values of the probabilities that we try to estimate using Bayesian inference.  
Table 3 
 System1 System2 System3 System4 
PROS 0 0 0.001 0.001 
PA|ROS failed 0 0 0.5 0.5 
PA|ROS did not fail 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.002 
PB|A did not fail, ROS did not fail  0 0.0035 0.005 0.002 
PB|A did not fail, ROS failed  0 0 0.5 0.002 
PB|A failed, ROS did not fail 1 0.3 0.005 0.002 
PB|A, ROS both failed 0 0 0.01 1.0 
Number of demands simulated 50,000 50,000 100,000 50,000 
PROS marginal 0 0 0.001 0.001 
Figure 5. The posterior system pfd when 
ROS and the UG component form a serial 
system. The posterior obtained with the 
coarse model is significantly worse than 
the predictions obtained with the 
recalibrated model. Both clearly indicate 
that the system is better than was assumed 
in the prior. 
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PA marginal 0.005 0.005 0.0015 0.0025 
PB marginal 0.005 0.00498 0.00525 0.0025 
 
The choice of parameters was motivated by trying to cover a range of plausible scenarios. The difference between 
System1 – System4 is in the reliability of individual components (the marginal probabilities of failure are shown at 
the bottom of the table) and in the level of correlation between the failures of the channels of the FT-component and 
between the failures of the FT-component and ROS. For System1 the channels of the FT-component always fail 
simultaneously, and never together with ROS. System2 is similar to System1 in the sense that ROS and the channels 
of the FT-component never fail together, but there is only 30% chance that the channels of the FT-component fail 
simultaneously. With System3 and System4 there are chances of simultaneous failure between ROS and the channels 
of the FT-component. The difference between the two is in the degree of correlation between the failures of ROS on 
the one hand and of the channels of the FT-components on the other hand: with System4 the correlation is much 
stronger than with System3. Note that with System4 channel B fails with certainty if both ROS and channel A have 
failed, while with System3 in similar circumstances the probability of failure of channel B is only 1%.  
 
In addition to the ‘observations’ collected by simulation the impact of the prior on the predictions was studied by 
defining different priors, ),,(,, UGROSUGROS pppf , and ),,(,, ABBA pppf , for the coarse model of the system and the 
refined model of the FT-component, respectively, which were constructed by making assumptions similar to those 
in the example given at the beginning of this section using a set of parameters: A, A, B, B, AB, AB. A, A for 
channel A, B, B for channel B, respectively, describe the uncertainty associated with the pfds of the two channels. 
AB, AB characterise the uncertainty about the conditional probability of simultaneous failure of channel A and B. 
Similarly, ROS, ROS, ROSUG, ROSUG, characterise the uncertainty about the probability of failure of ROS and 
the simultaneous failure of ROS and the FT-component, respectively. The parameters used in the study are shown 
in     Table 4. 
                Table 4 
 Prior1 Prior2 Prior3 Prior4 
A 2 20 1 10 
A 2 20 10 10 
B 3 20 1 10 
B 3 20 10 12 
AB 1 1 1 1 
AB 1 1 1 3 
ROS 3 1 1 1 
ROS 10 10 10 200 
ROSUG 3 3 1 1 
ROSUG 3 3 10 10 
 
Priors were chosen so that the degree of uncertainty in the pfds of the two channels of the FT-component, A and B 
and the uncertainty in the pfds of ROS and the failure correlation between ROS and UG also varied to enable study 
of how the prior affects the predictions. 
 
The findings are now illustrated, grouping the observations as summarised in Table 5 below. In the first four 
examples inference was applied using the first 5,000 observations of the simulated 50,000 demands of System1 and 
System2, respectively, using a fixed testing campaign size of 100 demands. In the other two examples the size of the 
‘testing campaigns’ varied between 25 and 200 showing the results with 200 campaigns, thus using between 5,000 
and 40,000 of the simulated demands for System3 and System4, respectively. The point of this parameterisation is to 
study how the intervals between recalibration affect the prediction accuracy.  
Table 5 
 Prior  
(refer to Figure 4) 
Observation 
(Table 3) 
Number of 
campaigns 
Demands per 
campaign 
Total number 
of demands 
Data1 Prior1 System1 50 100 5,000 
Data2 System2 50 100 5,000 
Data3 Prior2 System1 50 100 5,000 
Data4 System2 50 100 5,000 
Data5 Prior3 System3 25 200 5,000 
Data6 Prior4 System4 200 200 40,000 
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Bayesian inference is applied to each of Data1-Data6 using the three system models – black-box, coarse, and 
recalibrated – starting with consistent priors, calculated as follows: from the prior defined for the FT-component, 
the marginal distribution, )(
ABp
f , is derived and used as marginal distribution of the UG component in the coarse 
model. This distribution together with )(
ROSp
f , defined as a Beta distribution, ),,( ROSROSB  , and the 
conditional distributions ),|(,| UGROSppp PPf UGROSUGROS   defined as Beta distributions, ),,( UGROSUGROSB    
define the joint distribution of the coarse model from which, in turn, the marginal distribution of the system pfd is 
derived and used as a prior for the black-box model.  
The u-values and the PLR values were calculated for the number of system failures observed in each campaign. The 
values thus computed were then used to plot the respective graphs and compare the accuracy of the models on the 
simulated data. At the end of each testing campaign the coarse model was recalibrated using equation (9). The 
posteriors derived with the respective models at the end of each campaign (marginal in the case of black-box or 
joint in the case of coarse and recalibrated models) were then used as a prior in the next campaign, etc. 
Analysing the u-plots one would notice that the u-values (on the Y-axis that is, e.g. Figure 6) do not start from 0. 
The u-values are constructed for the random variable ‘the number of the system failures within a campaign of a 
given size’. Given the size of the campaign is between 25 and 200 tests for the examples shown here and the 
distributions of the system pfd are limited by the priors to small values (an upper bound of 0.02 and distribution 
mass often concentrated within a range much shorter than [0,0.02]) the probability of observing no system failures, 
P(0), may be significant, 0.75+ in the examples studied. Thus the u-plot values will be bound to be within the range 
[P(0), 1]. We plotted the u-plots using as an estimate of the P(0) the smallest u-value computed with each of the 
models.  
Clearly increasing the size of the campaigns will lead to a decrease of P(0). As shown in the Appendix for a 
campaign size of 1000 demands, P(0) can be very close to 0. 
4.3.1. Data 1 
 
  
    
Figure 6. Distribution of system pfd 
before and after testing. There is 
stochastic ordering between the posterior 
distributions – the black-box model 
produces the most optimistic predictions, 
while the recalibrated posterior is the 
most pessimistic. The predictions of the 
coarse model are in between.  
 
Figure 7. U-plot shows that most of the 
time the plots of all three models give 
pessimistic predictions. The ordering is 
the same as in Figure 6. 
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4.3.2. Data 2 
    
    
 
    
Figure 9. The plot shows that the prior 
chosen has been very conservative. The 
posteriors are very close: there is 
ordering between the three with the 
recalibrated model giving the most 
optimistic prediction, coarse – the most 
pessimistic, the black-box is in between. 
Figure 8. Prequential likelihood ratio 
shows minor superiority of the 
recalibrated model over the other two 
models with a tendency of all models 
eventually converging – they become 
indistinguishable, especially after 
3,500 demands. 
Figure 10. Interestingly, the PLR shows 
that the recalibrated model performs best 
– the difference is noticeable with the 
coarse model and practically negligible 
in comparison with the black-box model.  
 
Figure 11. The u-plot reveals that all 
three models give generally pessimistic 
predictions. One may conclude, therefore, 
that the predictions of the recalibrated 
model, although most optimistic are still 
likely to be pessimistic and can be chosen 
even if one would like to be conservative 
about the true system pfd.  
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4.3.3. Data 3 
    
    
 
    
4.3.4. Data 4 
    
 
Figure 12. This plot shows a case with an 
optimistic prior. All posteriors are moving 
towards more conservative ranges. The 
black-box and the coarse models offer very 
close posteriors, while the recalibrated 
model is significantly different and more 
pessimistic.   
 
Figure 13. Now, the PLR clearly shows 
the superiority of the recalibrated model at 
the early campaigns: it outperforms both 
the black-box and the coarse, which are 
indeed practically identical (their ratio 
remains close to 1). The recalibrated model 
despite being the most pessimistic should 
therefore be trusted.  
 
Figure 14. The observations from the 
PLR are now further corroborated by the 
u-plot. It looks like all predictions are 
pessimistic most of the time (the 
beginning of the curves which represents 
campaigns with no system failure – the 
initial curve, and a single failure – the 
first step of the plot), but when more than 
one failure occurs (the last fragments of 
the curves) the predictions by all three 
models seem optimistic. Clearly, we do 
not have a model that provides 
consistently pessimistic or optimistic 
predictions. 
Figure 15. This case is an example of a 
very pessimistic prior. It is also 
interesting in that there is no ordering 
between the posteriors – the cdfs of the 
recalibrated posterior crosses over the 
posteriors obtained with the other two 
models. The black-box and coarse 
predictions seems stochastically ordered: 
the black-box being more pessimistic. 
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4.3.5. Data 5 
    
    
 
Figure 16. The PLR shows an increasing 
trend in favour of the recalibrated model, 
although the gain is minimal. 
 
Figure 17. This plot, however, shows that 
the predictions of zero system failures by 
the recalibrated model are optimistic, 
noticeably so, while those by the other two 
models are generally pessimistic.  
Figure 18. This case is an example of how 
the three models may become 
indistinguishable. Looking closely at the 
parameterisation we notice that the failures 
of the two channels of the FT-component 
(Table 4) are highly correlated. Thus, fault 
tolerance brings practically no benefits. 
Observation wise, the recalibrated model 
brings no benefits in comparison with the 
coarse model. Even the black-box model 
‘sees’ everything that is important.  
Figure 19. This plot, too, shows no 
difference between the three models.  
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4.3.6. Data 6 
    
    
 
    
 
Figure 20. The same here – the u-plots of 
the three models are indistinguishable. 
 
Figure 21. This example is at the other 
extreme. Fault tolerance works very well 
with the FT-component: many individual 
channel failures occur, and few failures of 
all three components. Now the recalibrated 
model ‘sees’ much more than either of the 
other two models, Indeed many single 
channel failures occur which are masked by 
fault-tolerance. Not surprisingly, the 
predictions are different. The predictions by 
the coarse model are much more optimistic 
than the other two – the black-box is more 
pessimistic than the recalibrated model. 
 
Figure 22. Clearly, the predictions by the 
coarse model are optimistic. For the other 
two models the usual pattern is observed: 
pessimistic u-values for the case of zero 
system failures. 
 
Figure 23. This plot clearly shows the 
drastic superiority (notice that PLR reaches 
values of 7000) of the recalibrated model 
over the coarse model. 
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4.4. Selecting the best prediction model 
The plots shown in the previous section allow one to appreciate how the PLR and the u-plot differ between the 
predictions obtained with the different models. The examples also illustrate how the accuracy of the different 
models may change over time. The PLR and the u-plot were produced over the entire set of testing campaigns. 
Clearly, a more refined analysis is possible, e.g. by computing these on a sliding window of predictions as shown in 
Figure 25.  
 
 
Clearly, Figure 25, offers a basis for one to select the best performing model. A possible selection criterion at any 
point in time might be the value of the PLR computed on the last 20 consecutive predictions at any point of 
prediction. A value of the PLR greater than 1 will give preference to the recalibrated system, while values smaller 
than 1 will give preference to the coarse model. One can apply different criteria to increase the confidence in the 
selection of the best performing model, e.g. the recalibrated can be preferred when the PLR is greater than, e.g. 10, 
while for lower values the evidence is insufficient for preferring the recalibrated model.    
5. Discussion 
The interesting question for anyone faced with using alternative models of Bayesian assessment (compared here and 
indeed in any other inference model) is which of the alternative predictors one should trust. In the context of safety-
critical systems a prudent view would be to choose from the available alternatives the most conservative prediction 
[9]. There may be two aspects in this regard which are worth considering: 
 Is the most conservative prediction conservative at all? If all available alternatives are optimistic, e.g. as a result 
of starting the inference with unrealistically optimistic prior, then choosing the least optimistic may still be 
inadequate. 
 Even more interestingly – do we need to use the most conservative prediction at all? If we know that all 
alternatives are conservative, then any alternative, even the least conservative one, can be used for conservative 
predictions. An example of this possibility is given in Figure 11. 
A separate line of reasoning would be to consider the cost of being conservative. Using a conservative prediction to 
demonstrate that a specified target is met is effectively equivalent to asking for the cost of the assessment to be 
increased (e.g. by running longer testing campaigns), which may be simply unnecessary. Had we used an accurate 
prediction (instead of the most conservative) it might be possible to demonstrate that the set target on system 
Figure 24. Here we remove the ratio 
between the recalibrated and the coarse 
model, shown above (Figure 23) and look at 
how the other pairs compare. Clearly the 
recalibrated initially performs well and 
outperforms the black-box model. However, 
as the number of tests increases the black-
box becomes more accurate, although the 
trend suggests that the superiority may 
decrease.  
 
Figure 25. The PLR for Data 6 example is 
computed on a sliding window of 20 
consecutive predictions prior to a particular 
point in time. The shape differs from the 
aggregated figure shown in Figure 23.  
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reliability can be met more cheaply, e.g. with a shorter test. The numerous examples included in this paper show 
that the more detailed inference in some cases delivers more accurate predictions. The most advanced of the three 
models – the recalibrated – works better than the other two in most of the chosen examples. An important point to 
make is that the recalibrated model tends to work best when there are significant mismatches between the priors and 
the ‘true’ system reliability, especially when the channels of the FT-component are truly ‘diverse’, i.e. show failure 
diversity.  
These examples seem to suggest that a feasible Bayesian inference, significantly less complex than a full inference, 
may result in more accurate predictions than is currently possible with simplistic models of the system such as the 
black box or the coarse models which ignore some details of the system structure. The proposed approach to multi-
view Bayesian inference seems a significant improvement at acceptable price, compared with the Bayesian 
assessment typically used. 
However, the results have also shown that the recalibrated model should not be trusted a priori and always used. 
The contrived examples have been chosen carefully to cover various scenarios of how the predictions obtained with 
different models may be related to each other. The important outcome of the work is that the known techniques for 
assessing the prediction accuracy of competing models seem sufficient for one to be able to assess objectively which 
of the models gives the most accurate prediction and use that model.  
It is important also to appreciate the fact that the best performing model can change over time. This manifested 
itself with some of the examples although in the simulated systems their reliability remained unchanged. The reason 
for the change of the models’ performance seems to be the mismatch between the prior and the true reliability of the 
assessed systems. Different models converge to true reliability with a different speed, which results in their 
prediction accuracy being different. There are cases, however, when in addition to the mismatch between the prior 
and the true reliability, the true reliability of the assessed system may change over time, e.g. as a result of a change 
of the usage profile. The important point here is that PLR and u-plot seem sufficient to identify the most accurate 
model whatever the reason for the different accuracies of the predictions.  
As we have seen, being able to capture the trend of accuracy of the predictive models depends on the testing 
campaign (the intervals between applying recalibration). The size of the campaign should be chosen sensibly. Too 
long a campaign would imply that only slow changes of system reliability could be dealt with, while too short 
campaigns will make the techniques for assessing the accuracy (especially the u-plot) less useful. Indeed reducing 
the campaign size to a single demand will reduce the space of the possible observations to just 0 and 1, hence the u-
plot values will be limited to a very short range, e.g. [0.9+, 1]. 
Another aspect that has not been discussed so far is exploring the space of possible views. Currently one of the 
many possible ways of simplifying the full inference has been chosen for the given system structure: I chose to look 
in a separate view at the FT-component for obvious reasons. Data 5, however, clearly shows that there is no gain 
from using the FT-component view. It seems pretty clear that whether the recalibration will ‘work’, i.e. will produce 
more accurate predictions than the alternative models, depends on whether it captures the ‘important dependencies’ 
between the failures of the components. With Data 6 the model of the FT-component captures observations of 
individual channel failure which are masked by the fault tolerance and remain ‘invisible’ for the other models. The 
model of the FT-component, however, will not see dependence (i.e. correlation – positive or negative) between the 
failures of ROS and one of the channels of the FT-component. Using a separate view (different from the view of the 
FT-component, e.g. a model of the ROS and the particular channel of the FT-component) to capture such 
dependence might turn out to make the predictions more accurate than can be achieved with the current choice of 
views. These are important aspect which will be addressed in more detail in future work. I would like to stress, 
however, that with many different partial views the approach presented here will also work: we will simply have to 
deal with a larger space of models including many different recalibrated models (which represent different set of 
views applied to a given full system model). The objective, however, will remain the same – compare alternative 
predictions of system pfd and choose the model (possibly the particular way of recalibration) that gives the best 
prediction. 
Finally, in the examples used only one step of recalibration was applied – the predictions of the coarse model were 
recalibrated with the predicted distribution of the pfd of the FT component. We could, however, use multiple layers 
of refinement. Consider again our example in Figure 3, which was simplified by making an assumption that the 
component Interface is perfect. If such an assumption is not plausible, three different views of the system could 
have been defined, as shown in Figure 26. 
For this model of the system we could envisage two recalibrations: The pfd of the FT component will be used to 
recalibrate the posterior of the Refined view of UG subsystem in a way similar to 3.3. The difference is that the pfd 
of this sub-system, will be derived from the joint posterior, ),,(,, FTInterfaceFTInterface pppf  by first transforming it to a 
suitable form in which the system pfd (of a serial system), PUG is explicitly used and then integrating out the 
nuisance parameters. The marginal distribution )|( dataf
UGp

 
is then used to recalibrate the coarse model as 
described in 3.3.  
Clearly, the approach scales up – a structure of arbitrary complexity can be partitioned suitably into views which 
offer chains of model refinements by adding more detail on the system structure. Using a particular chain one can 
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make use of all parts of the respective model and data of the behaviour of its parts under the simplifications 
imposed by the particular chain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. The example system is shown again, in which the Interface component can also fail. Now a new view is defined – 
the Refined view of UG component, which consists of two components, the Interface and the FT component modelled as a serial 
system, i.e. a failure of either the Interface or of the FT component will lead to a failure of UG subsystem. The third view – of 
the FT component – is as before; it consists of the two channels A and B, which are modelled as a 1-out-of-2 parallel system.   
As an example one could “open up” the ROS, which in the presentation so far has been treated as a single 
component. In reality the ROS may consist of many individual components, whose behaviour might be observable, 
thus a complex non black-box model of the ROS can be constructed. Whether such an approach is useful will 
depend on the details of the specific system. As we have seen in the examples so far, predictions from the different 
models tend to converge over time. We assume that ROS will have been in operation for a long time, hence the 
black-box model of the ROS would eventually produce predictions about its pfd consistent with those of the more 
detailed models that could be used for ROS. We recognise, however, that using a more detailed model of ROS may 
increase significantly the space of the “chains of model refinements” that can be derived for the legacy system with 
an upgrade. The decision whether to explore this space of possibilities in search of more accurate predictions must 
be pragmatic. For instance, when all “chains of model refinements” based on ROS being treated as a black-box fail 
to produce an accurate prediction, then “opening up” ROS would seem justified. If with ROS as a black box, at least 
some of the models produce a prediction with an acceptable accuracy, opening up the ROS would seem 
unnecessary. 
Clearly, with a complex system structure, a number of alternative chains might be possible. In this case, each chain 
will offer an alternative way of assessing system reliability and different refinements. In other words, in addition to 
the black-box, the coarse system model and a single model with recalibration as discussed in Sections 3 and 4 we 
will have to compare several alternative recalibration-based predictions. The task of selecting the most accurate 
prediction, however, does not change – simply the space of available solutions from which one has to choose gets 
larger. 
Finally, I note that the motivation of the work presented here was based on demonstrating the difficulties in using a 
complete Bayesian inference with a system buit with multiple software components. In this case, the inference 
would rely on a model with many degrees of freedom, which is typically difficult to parameterise. As a result the 
benefits from a complete inference may be cancelled out by parameterisation inaccuracies. During the discussion of 
the paper with my colleagues we realised that the motivation could have been based on practical considerations: 
refining a model is only a good idea if data is available that can be made use of. From this point of view, the 
procedure presented here may be seen as a ‘natural’ way of adding details to the model when more detailed data 
about the behaviour of the channels of the FT component becomes available from more detailed measurements 
either during the testing or from operational use. The black-box view on the FT component may be useful at some 
point in the assessment and in the absence of information about the failures of its channels may be the only useful 
model of the FT component. As operational data becomes available about the behaviour of the parallel channels, 
however, one may decide to make use of this data (instead of throwing it away with a black-box model) and revise 
the model accordingly. The proposed approximate inference clearly offers one way of using the more detailed data.  
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6. Related research 
The issue of Bayesian assessment of software built with off-the-shelf components attracted some interest. In a 
number of papers Kuball et al. advocated a model of software of arbitrary complex structure built with off-the-shelf 
software components under the assumption that the components fail independently, [10], [11]. I scrutinised their 
results, [12], and contrary to the assertions by those authors that the prediction errors due to the assumption of 
independence of failures lead to conservative predictions, observed that the sign of predictions is unknowable – the 
predictions that result can be overestimation or underestimation of system reliability, which poses questions about 
the usefulness of the models based on assuming independence of failures for practical assessment. Models of 
systems built with independent components have been studied very extensively and general results obtained [7].  
In a previous paper, [3], we presented a Bayesian reliability assessment of 2-channel fault-tolerant software. In 
particular we were interested in whether a non black-box inference allows us to be confident that a predefined 
reliability target is met, faster than if this knowledge is ignored and the system is treated as a black box. We 
succeeded in demonstrating that using an inference procedure which takes into account the system structure and 
more detailed observations leads to predictions which generally differ from the black-box predictions. The 
predictions thus obtained may be more pessimistic or more optimistic than the ones obtained with the black-box 
inference.  In general even the sign of the difference is unknowable in advance, i.e. it is impossible to know in 
advance what error one is making by using the black-box inference. This depends on both the prior and the 
observations. 
Surprisingly, it turned out that some convenient priors likely to be considered by an assessor in practical 
assessment, because they simplify the inference, lead to counterintuitive results: 
 When a Dirichlet distribution3 is used as a prior, the black-box and white-box inferences give exactly the same 
posterior predictions on the probability of system failure no matter the observations. Hence using a white-box 
inference with Dirichlet gives no advantage over black-box inference, which is simpler. 
 If the probabilities of failure of the two channels are assumed known with certainty, then the Bayesian inference 
may lead to counterintuitive predictions (posteriors). For instance, if no failure of either of the channels is 
observed (i.e. both channels passed all tests), the predicted system reliability is worse than what was assumed 
for it a priori. More precisely, the probability that the system meets a given reliability target gets lower than 
was assumed a priori after observing no channel failures (i.e. the best possible outcome), which is clearly 
counterintuitive. The reason for this counterintuitive result is the assumed certainty in the reliability of the two 
channels and suggests that assuming certainty in the priors can have serious consequences and should be used 
only after a very careful justification (e.g. that it is impossible to observe no channel failure). 
In an interesting study, Kristiansen et al. [13], established empirically that for systems built with software 
components the system dependability is typically more sensitive to dependencies between parallel components than 
to dependencies between serial components. They advocate that an inference procedure must account explicitly for 
dependencies between the parallel components, while those between the serial components can be ignored without 
significant loss of accuracy. The choice of the refined model of the FT-component happens to follow these authors’ 
recommendation. Whether the empirical observation by Kristiansen et al. is universally true is unclear.  
The proposed approach based on recalibration is somewhat similar to the Bayesian procedure developed in [14] for 
components with independently distributed pfds, in which the authors use a combination of black-box inference on 
system reliability and inferences on components’ reliability in several steps: after the posterior is derived using a 
black-box model (called a preliminary posterior), using the system configuration (the structure function) to derive a 
consistent prior for the components’ reliability. Then the data is used to derive posteriors for the components’ 
reliabilities, which are then used to derive the final posterior system reliability. This procedure seems to use what 
we called recalibration from the system model to the component models (to define priors for the components 
consistent with the preliminary system posterior) and back from the component models to derive the final system 
posterior. As [7] suggests the procedure of propagating (i.e. recalibrating) between the system/component models is 
quite generic and a number of variations for systems built with components with independently distributed pfds 
have been developed since the publication of [7]. The difference of the approach proposed here in comparison with 
these previous models is that it does not require that the pfds of the components be independently distributed.  
The work presented here is also related to Bayesian Belief Nets (BBN) which have attracted interest in the past 
decade. The multi-view approach to assessment is a way of dealing with complexity. BBNs address this problem of 
complexity using conditional independence assumptions, which need to be justified. The inference procedure 
presented here does not depend on making assumptions of conditional independence. Instead of building a model of 
the entire system (i.e. a single BBN which involves a graph which shows the assumed conditional independencies 
between the variates) it deals with the multiple partial views in which a subset of the variates are integrated out. 
The approach with BBNs is different – the BBN structure states explicitly the conditional independence properties 
between the variates. Once the conditional independence assumptions are made they will stay in the model 
whatever the data. Wright and Littlewood have demonstrated that with a given set of conditional independence 
                                                          
3  The Dirichlet distribution is the multivariate generalisation of the Beta distribution and forms a conjugate family with the 
multinomial likelihood (3). If the prior is defined as a Dirichlet distribution, the posterior is also a Dirichlet with parameters that 
can be easily computed from the parameters of the prior and the observed counts of failure and success of the components. 
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assumptions a number of different BBNs can be built, all consistent with the stated assumptions. The process of 
deriving the set can be automated and thus the space of possible BBNs explored in detail. In a sense, using BBNs is 
an alternative to the chains of views described in this paper. In this sense the approach and the BBN are 
complementary.  
7. Conclusions and future research 
This paper presents an approach to Bayesian reliability assessment of a complex system, which consists of many 
software components. The presented results suggest that the approach can solve two problems: 
- Bayesian inference can be decomposed into manageable steps, each of which deals with a partial view on the 
system or parts thereof with simple structure. As a result, the steps do not require complex multivariate priors. 
Instead, they only depend on relatively simple and intuitive priors, eliciting which is practicable; 
- The accuracy of Bayesian predictive models can be controlled using well known and relatively simple 
techniques developed in the past. With the proposed method many alternative predictive models are built and 
the system is assessed using all of these. Their predictions are compared and the optimal one for the specific 
context is chosen, e.g. one that gives the most accurate predictions or which satisfies some additional 
constraints, for instance giving the least pessimistic predictions among the available alternatives. 
The method is illustrated on a range of contrived examples, for most of which the method performed better than the 
alternative simplistic models, although its superiority is not guaranteed. 
Among the areas for future research I envisage the following: 
- Deciding on the optimal set of partial models possible with a system requires further study. Using partial 
models inevitably throws away some of the information about the possible dependencies between the failures 
of the components – this is the real price of not using the full model. Deciding a priori, which dependencies are 
important may be difficult, possibly impossible. Exploring the space of partial models may be on the other 
hand too costly computationally which warrants further scrutiny. 
- Even with relatively simple systems like the one used in this paper to illustrate the approach, the computational 
complexity of the assessment increases significantly. For instance in comparison with a black-box inference, 
the proposed method is many-fold more expensive in terms of computation resources required. For off-line 
assessment the speed of the inference does not pose a problem. There are, however, many potential 
applications, which may require fast inference on live data, such as critical infrastructures, cloud computing, 
etc. For this category of applications the speed of the inference becomes an issue and this will be addressed in 
future work. 
- This work has not addressed how difficult it is algorithmically to choose the best model: the selection was 
based on processing visually the u-lot and PLR. Being able to automate the selection of the best model is 
important, e.g. in case of continuous on-line assessment, and this concern will be addressed in future work.  
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Appendix 1 
A short summary of these methods is given here in order to make this report self-contained. The text given here is 
based on [8]. A more detailed study of the techniques applied to discrete models, i.e. in which the parameter of 
interest is the number of failures in a fixed number of demands, was undertaken by Wright [15].  
A.1.1. The u-plot 
Let us assume that we have a series of observations, t1, t2, …, tn, of a random variable T
4
. The u-plot uses the 
predictor  tF i

, the estimate of the distribution    tTPtF ii  , via: 
 iii tFu

  
where ti is the later observed realisation of the random variable Ti. Thus ui is the value of the cumulative distribution 
function (cdf) corresponding to the observation ti. If the sequence of predictions {  ii tF

} is good, then {ui} will 
tend to be uniformly distributed.  The u-plot is the sample cdf of the sequence {ui}.  
In reliability growth models the random variable of interest for which the u-plot is calculated are the inter-failure 
times (e.g. the number of demands between the failures) [8], but the method does not prevent us from using any 
other observable random variable.  
In this case if we divide the overall number of tests, N, into ‘testing campaigns’, n1, n2, …, (e.g. of fixed size, 50, 
100, 250, 500, 1000 demands), then the number of observed failures (of the system or of any subsystem thereof), 
m1, m2, …, will be realisations of a random variable, M, with a binomial distribution, B(ni, p), where ni is the 
number of tests in the campaign and p is the system pfd, which in turn is a random variable distributed as defined by 
the respective prior distribution of the system pfd (prior to the particular ‘testing campaign’).  
Let us denote that the probability density function of the distribution of the system pfd at the beginning of the i-th 
testing campaign as  
isys
f . Then the u-plot value from this testing campaign is: 
    


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Indeed this is the cdf of observing up to mi failures in ni trials (demands) when the probability of failure in a trial is a 
random variable with a density function  
isys
f .  
A.1.2. The prequential likelihood 
Let us assume that the predictive distribution  tF i

 has a probability density function (pdf): 
   tFtf ii

 '  
For predictions Tj+1, Tj+2, Tj+n, the prequential likelihood (PL) is defined as: 
   




nj
ji
iin tfjPL
1
, t  
A comparison of two prediction systems, A and B, over a range of predictions of Tj+1, Tj+2, Tj+n can be made via 
their PL ratio: 
 
 
 





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

nj
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, t  
It has been shown that if   t,jPLRn as n  prediction system B is discredited (i.e. has worse performance) 
in favour of system A. It is worth pointing out that while the u-plot indicated the type of inaccuracy – pessimistic or 
optimistic – the  t,jPLRn  just indicates which of the two predicting systems gives more accurate predictions 
without indicating the sign of the error of either of the predicting systems. 
In our case we can see the testing as a series of campaigns and use the probability of the particular observation, i.e. 
the number of successes/failures, during the campaign as  tf i

, from which to calculate the  t,jPLRn .  
Similarly to the u-plot, we will divide the overall testing into testing campaigns with n1, n2, …, etc. demands in each 
of them and the number of observed failures during these campaigns, m1, m2, …, etc. . Each of the compared models 
                                                          
4 In [8] the description is given for ‘next time to failure’, but applies for any random variable. 
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– black-box, coarse, and recalibrated – models will have produced a distribution of the system pfd, which is denoted 
as  j
sysi
f .  
In detail, for each of the campaigns, i, for model, j, we compute 
j
ipr : 
   




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n
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i
iii 1 , 
The new values (to be precise the ratio of the respective 
j
ipr s) are counted in computing the value of the 
prequential likelihood accumulated up to campaign i.  
A.1.3. Illustrations 
How the two techniques work is illustrated here with two examples, called Case 1: optimistic prior, and Case 2: 
pessimistic prior. Details of the particular data used to compute the plots are omitted as the purpose of the plots is 
purely illustrative. 
One can appreciate how different the two cases are. The u-plot with Case 1 is above the unit slope, which is an 
indication that the predictions obtained are systematically optimistic. The u-plot in Case 2 is under the unit slope 
which indicates that the predictions are systematically pessimistic. 
The PLR plot reveals that in Case 1 we can barely prefer one prediction to another – the black-box is the best (but 
the difference is not really significant – the ratio computed on a relatively large number of campaigns remains 
modest), the coarse model is marginally better than the recalibrated. The recalibrated in this case turns out to be the 
worst. The fact that we can hardly differentiate between the models is clear from the u-plot, too – the u-plots are 
very close to each other. 
A slightly different picture is revealed by Case 2. The u-plots show that the predictions of all three models are 
pessimistic, but the degree of pessimism is different: the coarse model is the least pessimistic, while the recalibrated 
is the most pessimistic. The PLR plot reveals further details. At the beginning, up to the 20
th
 campaign the black 
box prediction is the best – it outperforms both the coarse and the recalibrated model. Starting from the 21st 
campaign, however, the coarse model outperforms the black-box model and there is a clear trend for the superiority 
to increase, i.e. the coarse system model best captures the system behaviour. 
 
    
 
    
 
 
